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INTRODUCTION
Given the level of discretionary funding that has been made avail-
able to him by Congress and the way he has chosen to exercise his
administrative authority, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan is for
all practical purposes the most powerful federal executive in the his-
tory of American education, pushing the boundaries of the federal/
state relationship to new limits.  This essay provides a critical review of
federal education policy enacted under President Barack Obama with
a particular focus on the centerpiece Race to the Top initiative imple-
mented by Secretary Duncan.  It assesses the Obama policy in the con-
text of the evolving federal role in education that began with the
passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of
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1965 as an effort to improve educational opportunity for economically
disadvantaged students.  It argues that while the Obama agenda is a
reasonable attempt to reshape educational policy (and particularly No
Child Left Behind), contrary to what the administration claims, its
approach to education policy is neither entirely research based nor
apolitical, and the competitive nature of the funding may eventually
prove to undermine the redistributive objectives of the original ESEA
legislation.
Part I of this essay traces the evolution of federal education pol-
icy.  It will begin by examining the objectives and strategies originally
enunciated by President Lyndon B. Johnson with the passage of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.  It will then explain
how these goals changed over the years through the administration of
President Bill Clinton, as the program became less concerned with
directing resources to children who were economically disadvantaged
and more concerned with accountability.  Part II reviews the details of
the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation enacted during the
administration of President George W. Bush, which established the
political and programmatic context for policymaking during the
Obama administration.  Although this legislation was designed to
impose accountability on states that accepted federal funding, it also
highlighted the needs of children who were denied an opportunity
for a decent education, a disproportionate number of whom were eco-
nomically disadvantaged children of color.
Part III scopes out the broad outlines of the Obama education
agenda, while Part IV assesses the main provisions of the Race to the
Top (RTT) initiative.  Particular attention is given in the latter to
those provisions that pertain to testing and standards, teacher evalua-
tion, turnaround strategies for failing schools, and charters and
choice.  Part V describes how Secretary of Education Arne Duncan
used his administrative discretion to make No Child Left Behind more
consistent with the objectives of Race to the Top.  Part VI serves as a
conclusion.
I. ESEA AND THE EVOLVING FEDERAL ROLE
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) that Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson managed to push through Congress in 1965 was
a historical breakthrough in a country that had traditionally consid-
ered education a state and local function.  The initial appropriation of
$1 billion in funding was doubled in 1966, and by the end of the dec-
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ade was up to $3 billion.1 Under Title I, the major provision of the
law, funds were specifically to be appropriated to communities on the
basis of economic need.  The legislation read:
In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-
income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income
families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support
adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to
be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance . . .
to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of
children from low-income families . . . .2
In order to gain support of the Catholic lobby, the law guaran-
teed that poor children attending private and parochial schools would
not be excluded from participating in the program.3  In order to
address potential constitutional problems arising under the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment and defuse anti-Catholic senti-
ment coming from Southern legislators, the law provided that all
funds and programs would be administered by public schools.4  Paro-
chial school students were permitted to participate through the use of
audio-visual devices, television and radio programs, and mobile teach-
ing units.  The precautions taken in ESEA represented a legislative
enactment of the “child benefit theory” enunciated in the courts,
which recognizes a legal distinction between aid provided to students
and aid provided to schools or institutions.5
1 See STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION
ADMINISTERS A LAW 37–71 (1968) (providing legislative history).  For a more detailed
account, see JULIE ROY JEFFREY, EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN OF THE POOR (1978).
2 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 201, 79
Stat. 27, 27 (repealed 1981).
3 See JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE TRIUMPH & TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON 71
(1991).
4 See id.
5 See EUGENE EIDENBERG & ROY D. MOREY, AN ACT OF CONGRESS 75–95 (1969)
(explaining the application of the principle in the drafting of ESEA).  The child bene-
fit concept first arose in a 1930 case upholding a Louisiana law that set aside tax funds
to pay for textbooks for public, private, and parochial schools.  This was not a First
Amendment challenge, however. See Cochran v. Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 373, 375
(1930).  The court later applied the theory in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
16 (1947), which found that providing transportation services to students in religious
schools in New Jersey did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment.  Child benefit theory also provided an essential part of the reasoning for subse-
quent landmark cases that allowed tuition aid to children attending religious schools.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983); see also JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, THE LAST FREEDOM (2007) (providing a gen-
eral critique of First Amendment jurisprudence involving religion); Joseph P. Viter-
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The legislative strategy undertaken to accommodate the Estab-
lishment Clause was remarkable in light of the fact that Congress had
previously made aid available to religious institutions under the GI
Bill, the National Defense Education Act, the National School Lunch
Act, and the Hill-Burton Hospital Reconstruction Act.6  Notwithstand-
ing these precautions, in 1985 the United States Supreme Court
decided that public school teachers could not be sent into parochial
school buildings to provide remedial instruction.7  The ruling
required public school districts to rent additional space so that
instruction could be delivered on religiously neutral territory.  The
decision was eventually overruled in 1997,8 on an appeal from the
New York City school district, which had claimed that renting extra
space was costing more than $14 million annually.9
ESEA was part of a larger campaign to provide educational
opportunities to poor and minority children that began with the
landmark Brown v. Board of Education10 decision of 1954 that prohib-
ited racial segregation in schools.  The Civil Rights Act of 196411
required previously segregated school districts to submit desegrega-
tion plans or risk the loss of federal funding.  In addition to providing
extra aid for low-income students, President Johnson had hoped that
the infusion of new federal money through ESEA would provide
school districts with an added incentive to comply with the desegrega-
tion mandate.12  The spending-incentive approach utilized by Presi-
dent Johnson was a shrewd tool through which officials at the federal
level could affect policy in the states and localities.  It would be
applied by subsequent presidents, but none so effectively as President
Obama and his Secretary of Education Arne Duncan.
Over time, research would prove that ESEA was falling very short
of its goal to enhance the educational opportunities of poor children.
In 1969 Martin and McClure completed a study on behalf of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund arguing that Title I monies were misused
itti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Liberty, Equality and Pluralism, 76 S. CAL. L. REV.
1105 (2003) (offering a detailed analysis of the latter case and its significance).
6 BAILEY & MOSHER, supra note 1, at 33. R
7 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 408 (1985).
8 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997).
9 Joseph Berger, Limit on Remedial Education Appealed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1996,
at A25.
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See generally MARTHA MINOW, IN Brown’s Wake (2010)
(documenting the impact of Brown on federal education policy); ROSEMARY C. SALO-
MONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW (1986) (same).
11 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a–2000n-6 (2006)).
12 CALIFANO, supra note 3, at 70. R
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by school districts, finding that the districts used their appropriations
as a form of general aid without spending it on low income children
who were supposed to be its beneficiaries.13  In a subsequent article,
Jerome Murphy concluded that thirty percent of the administrators
participating in Title I did not want to use funds exclusively for stu-
dents from economically disadvantaged families.14
In 1984, the first longitudinal study of the ESEA program showed
that although there was some evidence that the students in the pro-
gram accelerated at a faster pace than their peers, these gains were
not sustained over time.15  A year earlier, Secretary of Education Ter-
rell Bell published A Nation at Risk (NAR). 16  The widely read report
alerted the nation to the fact it was falling behind the rest of the devel-
oped world in academic achievement.17  It also documented high
rates of adult illiteracy, declining scores on college entrance examina-
tions, and a rise in remedial programs in colleges, corporations, and
the military.18  It recommended the strengthening of high school
graduation requirements; setting rigorous, measurable performance
standards; the more effective use of time in school; a longer school
day and school year; and improvements in the preparation, compen-
sation, and accountability of teachers.19  Education historians mark
the report as the beginning of the standards movement, if not the
entire modern school reform movement. 20
Despite the fact that the NAR report was commissioned by his
own Secretary of Education, President Ronald Reagan did not show
13 RUBY MARTIN & PHYLLIS MCCLURE, TITLE I OF ESEA: IS IT HELPING POOR CHIL-
DREN? (1969).
14 Jerome T. Murphy, Title I: Bureaucratic Politics and Poverty Politics, 6 INEQUALITY
IN EDUC. 9 (1970) (citing BAILEY & MOSHER, supra note 1, at 316); Jerome T. Murphy, R
Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform, 41 HARV. EDUC. REV.
35, 49 (1971).
15 Launor F. Carter, The Sustaining Effects Study of Compensatory and Elementary Edu-
cation, 13 EDUC. RESEARCHER, Aug. –Sept. 1984, at 4, 6.
16 NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK. (1983).  For com-
mentary on the report and its impact, see Milton Goldberg & Anita Madan Renton, A
Nation at Risk: Ugly Duckling No Longer, in COMMISSIONS, REPORTS, REFORMS, AND EDU-
CATIONAL POLICY 19 (Rick Ginsberg & David N. Plank eds., 1995); A NATION
REFORMED? (David T. Gordon ed., 2003); A Nation at Risk: A 20-Year Reappraisal, 79
PEABODY J. EDUC. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2004);.
17 See Rick Ginsberg & David N. Plank, Introduction to COMMISSIONS, REPORTS,
REFORMS, AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY, supra note 16, at 3, 9. R
18 Id. at 11.
19 See Goldberg & Renton, supra note 16, at 17–24. R
20 See, e.g., MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, FROM A Nation at Risk to No Child Left Behind
(2009); Diane Ravitch, A Historic Document, in OUR SCHOOLS AND OUR FUTURE 25,
34–35 (Paul E. Peterson, ed., 2003).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-5\NDL510.txt unknown Seq: 6  2-AUG-12 10:36
2092 notre dame law review [vol. 87:5
much interest in education.  Believing  that schooling is a state and
local function, he had pledged to abolish the federal Department of
Education created by President Jimmy Carter, but the shockwaves that
the report sent through the country kept education very much in the
public consciousness.21  Within a year, thirty-five states had set new
graduation requirements, twenty-two developed curriculum reforms,
and twenty-nine set new policies regarding testing.22
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush attended a meeting with
the nation’s governors in Charlottesville, Virginia in order to engage
the state executives in a discussion on how to make education a
national priority.  It was an unusual move for a Republican president.
More unusual was the enthusiasm with which the state officials
embraced the offer of federal cooperation.23  In response to Bush, the
National Governor’s Association agreed to create a National Educa-
tion Goals Panel that would develop a national report card for assess-
ing progress towards specific academic goals.24  These goals were the
foundation for “America 2000,” a more comprehensive proposal put
forward by President Bush that fell to defeat in a Democrat-controlled
Congress in 1991.25  In addition to proposing national goals, the Bush
package included voluntary national testing.26  Under its new provi-
sions, students in Title I public schools would have been permitted to
transfer to public, private, or religious schools of their choice, taking
their federal funding with them.27
In 1997, Abt Associates completed another major study of ESEA
involving 40,000 students that found no discernible difference in aca-
demic performance between students in the program and a control
group.28  Study after study had shown that despite years of spending,
the learning gap between the races and between rich and poor stu-
21 PATRICIA ALBJERG GRAHAM, SCHOOLING AMERICA 153–58 (2005) (discussing
President Reagan’s reaction to the report).
22 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION RESPONDS 144–46 (1984) (including a chart
depicting state educational reforms).
23 See VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 10–31. R
24 See DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 57–58
(1995).
25 See id. at 138–39.
26 See id. at 139–43.
27 See id. at 139.
28 MICHAEL J. PUMA, ET AL., ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON
STUDENT OUTCOMES vi (1997). See also David J. Hoff, Chapter 1 Aid Failed to Close Learn-
ing Gap, EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 2, 1997, at 1 (describing a study finding that Title I failed
to close the learning gap)
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dents remained the same.29  By the time President Bill Clinton was
elected, there was a deep sense of frustration with the quality of Amer-
ican education, and demands for more accountability had gained
strong momentum.30  A key player among the state governors who
had signed on to work with President Bush, Clinton had pledged to
help develop national education standards when he campaigned for
the White House.31  With the Democrats in control of both houses of
Congress, Clinton could be somewhat more successful than his
predecessor.32
The “Goals 2000” plan that Clinton put before Congress in 1994
had a strong resemblance to Bush’s “America 2000.”33  It outlined a
set of national education goals, and authorized the formation of a
National Education Goals Panel.34  Despite pleas from Republican
lawmakers, it did not include a choice provision.35  The overall strat-
egy of “Goals 2000” was to offer financial incentives for states to
develop improvement plans.36  Grants were also made available for
consortia around the country to develop voluntary opportunity-to-
learn standards involving curricula instructional materials and tech-
nologies. While the resulting network of professionals from state gov-
ernment, local school districts, labor unions, universities, business,
and the health professions was large and cumbersome, it did manage
to propel a national movement for standards and assessments.37
Almost every state began to develop new academic criteria and mea-
surements, although the criteria for review by the Secretary of Educa-
tion were not very rigorous.38
29 See Geoffrey D. Borman & Jerome V. D’Agostino, Title I and Student Achieve-
ment: A Meta-Analysis of Federal Evaluation Results, 18 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALY-
SIS 309, 324 (1996) (detailing the results of 17 federal studies comparing Title I
students to control groups).
30 See RAVITCH, supra note 24, at 1; Marshall S. Smith, Education Reform in America’s R
Public Schools: The Clinton Agenda, in DEBATING THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 9,
9–10 (Diane Ravitch ed., 1995).
31 See Federal Education Policy and the States, 1945–2009, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T,
http://www.archives.nysed.gov/edpolicy/research/res_essay_bush_ghw_edsummit.
shtml (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
32 See id. at 17–19 (discussing the passage of Goals 2000).
33 See id. at 20–25 (describing the Goals 2000 legislation); Richard Riley, Reflec-
tions on Goals 2000, 96 TCHRS. C. REC. 380 (1995); Smith, supra note 30, at 10–25 R
(describing in detail the administration of Goals 2000).
34 Smith, supra note 30, at 17. R
35 See RAVITCH, supra note 24, at 139. R
36 See Smith, supra note 30, at 20. R
37 See id. at 21–22.
38 See VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 115–17. R
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As Clinton was about to complete his first term in office, ESEA—
still the largest portion of the federal education budget, was due for
reauthorization.  At that point an appropriation of $6.3 billion was
delivering services to more than 5 million students.39  Clinton had
hoped to convert Title I (then called Chapter I) into a standards-
based program.  The Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA) he got
passed through a Republican controlled Congress in 1994 increased
spending significantly.40  States were told that they would need to
adopt rigorous academic standards and assessments in order to qualify
for funding, but the Department of Education hesitated to enforce
tough standards when reviewing applications.41  Clinton later tried to
develop a set of voluntary national tests, but Congress would not coop-
erate.42  Liberal Democrats were reluctant to set higher targets for
underperforming children without a larger infusion of resources; con-
servative Republicans were uncomfortable with the prospect of having
Washington oversee a system of national testing.43
By the end of 2001, only nineteen states complied with IASA
assessment requirements.  None of those in violation lost funding.44
Research was continuing to show that money meant for low-income
students was not reaching them.45  More importantly, there was no
significant progress in narrowing the learning gap.46
II. NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
There is a general misunderstanding that No Child Left Behind
(NCLB), enacted in January 2002, was a bold federal initiative
imposed by President George W. Bush to wrest accountability from
recalcitrant state governments.  In actuality, NCLB garnered wide
bipartisan support, having passed in the House of Representatives by a
39 VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 75–76. R
40 For a general legislative history, see VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 75–84.  For a R
detailed breakdown of the law, see generally JAMES B. STEDMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., IMPROVING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF P.L. 103-382 (1994), avail-
able at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED379792.pdf.
41 STEDMAN, supra note 40, at 8. R
42 See RAVITCH, supra note 24, at 156–57. R
43 See id. at 150–51.
44 VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 172. R
45 See CHRISTOPHER T. CROSS, POLITICAL EDUCATION 141 (updated ed. 2010).
46 See PAUL E. BARTON & RICHARD J. COLEY, EDUC. TESTING SERV., THE BLACK-
WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 34 (2010) (finding that while some progress occurred dur-
ing the 1970’s and 1980’s, overall progress grew slower between then and 2008). See
generally STEADY GAINS AND STALLED PROGRESS (Katherine Magnuson & Jane Waldfogel
eds., 2008) (presenting several empirical studies regarding the race gap in standard-
ized testing).
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vote of 381 to 41, and in the Senate by 87 to 10.47  To be sure, the
presence of a Republican in the White House with a strong commit-
ment to education reform was essential to convince GOP law makers
that the time was right for Washington to set more exacting terms in
exchange for federal dollars, but Democratic leaders like Senator Ted
Kennedy and Representative George Miller also played pivotal roles in
getting the bill through the legislative process.48  There was also wide
support in the states themselves.49
Bush had made education a high priority as governor of Texas,
but he was not unique.  Ever since 1983, when Secretary of Education
Terrell Bell published A Nation at Risk50 and began ranking the states
by performance, it became difficult for state executives to ignore pub-
lic demands for better schools.51  By 2001, every state in the union had
developed content standards in reading and math, and twenty-eight
had created some kind performance standards.52  In a subtle way
NCLB affirmed what was already occurring in the states, at least in so
far as standards were concerned, and made additional federal money
available for the efforts.
Unlike Clinton’s IASA initiative that made testing more or less
voluntary on a practical level, NCLB mandated testing and standards
as a condition for funding.  States that chose not to participate could
turn down federal funding and be exempt from the requirements of
the new law.  Therefore NCLB was not truly a mandate.53  In order to
47 PAUL MANNA, SCHOOL’S IN 127 (2006).
48 For the legislative history of NCLB, see PATRICK J. MCGUINN, NO CHILD LEFT
BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY, 1965–2005, at
165–76 (2006); Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forging a Congressional Com-
promise, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND? 23, 33–43 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds.,
2003).  On the partisan roles, see generally Tom Loveless, The Peculiar Politics of No
Child Left Behind, in STANDARDS-BASED REFORM AND THE POVERTY GAP (Adam Gamoran
ed., 2007).
49 See CROSS, supra note 45, at 141 (citing a survey that showed support for NCLB R
in 45 states).
50 See supra note 16. R
51 For a description of evolving state initiatives, see Maris A. Vinovskis, Gubernato-
rial Leadership and American K-12 Education, in A LEGACY OF INNOVATION (Ethan
Sribnick ed., 2008).
52 VINOVSKIS, supra note 20, at 117. R
53 In 2007, the states of Michigan, Texas, and Vermont sued in federal court
claiming that the Department of Education could not force them to comply with the
law unless the federal government made sufficient additional funding available to
cover the costs of compliance.  After the trial court rejected their claims, the Sixth
Circuit ruled in their favor, 2-1, but the Court of Appeals then reheard the case en
banc and reached a split decision, leaving the district court ruling in effect.  See Sch.
Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2009).
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sweeten the pie, federal funding was increased twenty percent from
$18.8 billion to $22 billion at the inception of the law.54  Some spend-
ing flexibility was built into the new Title I Program, while at the same
time changes were made in the formula that would funnel additional
assistance to economically depressed districts, as had been intended
in the original version of the law.55  The grand federalist bargain
within NCLB was to grant states the authority to develop their own
tests and set their own standards.  Under the new law, states would be
expected to administer annual tests in reading and math for grades
three through eight by 2005–2006.  State test scores must be disaggre-
gated at the school, school district, and state levels in a number of
discrete categories: race, gender, income, disability, and English lan-
guage proficiency.56
States were required to set annual targets for improving achieve-
ment and closing performance gaps between discrete groups of stu-
dents.57  Baselines and measures for “annual yearly progress” (AYP)
had to be developed.58  All students were expected to reach profi-
ciency by 2014.59  Additional funding was made available under NCLB
for reading instruction.  While states and districts could choose their
own reading programs, they had to adopt a phonics (as a opposed to
whole language) approach in order to quality for funding.  All states
accepting federal funding under NCLB would also be required to par-
ticipate in the National Assessment for Educational Progress (NAEP)
testing regime administered nationally to random samples of students
in reading and math.60
Schools failing to meet state performance objectives for two con-
secutive years were to be identified as “in need of improvement.”  The
designation made them eligible for technical assistance from their
states, and students attending them were supposed to be given an
opportunity to attend another public school.61  After an additional
year in such a designation, parents were to be given a portion of Title
54 Under President George W. Bush, total spending for elementary and secon-
dary education grew from $27.3 billion in 2001 to $37.9 billion in 2008 (39%). U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATION DEPARTMENT BUDGET HISTORY TABLE (2011), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/edhistory.pdf (last visited Mar.
6, 2012).
55 See CROSS, supra note 45, at 140–41. R
56 See id. at 138–39.
57 Id.
58 See id. at 139.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 MCGUINN, supra note 48, at 180 tbl.9.2 (providing table summarizing NCLB R
provisions).
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I funding to pay for supplemental services from a state-approved pro-
vider outside the school.62  During the third year in this category, the
school would be expected to make major changes in its personnel.63
After the fourth consecutive year, a school would be required to
undergo a major organizational overhaul, which could involve closing,
converting to a charter school, or assumption of control by a private
management company.64
In its original proposal to Congress, the Bush administration
wanted to grant students at failing schools the right to transfer to pri-
vate and religious schools and take their funding with them.  The pro-
posal was opposed by Democratic Party leaders and even some
members of Bush’s own party who were not ready to support a
voucher type plan initiated in Washington.65  The charter school and
private provider provisions in the latter part of the law, however, were
very much in keeping with Bush’s policy priorities, which were sup-
portive of school choice and open to having private providers involved
in public education.
At the insistence of Democratic Party leaders, especially Repre-
sentative George Mitchell, NCLB also tried to address the need for
better-prepared teachers.  Funds were made available for the recruit-
ment, retention, and training of teachers and principals.  Beginning
in the 2002–2003 school year, all new teachers hired with Title I fund-
ing would need to carry ratings of “highly qualified.”66  By 2005–2006,
all Title I instructors would need to meet that standard, and all teach-
ers in core courses would be required to have a college degree and to
prove their competence either by passing a state test or having
majored in their assigned subject areas.67  Teacher aides hired to work
in Title I programs after 2002–2003 would be expected to have two
years of college.68  Overall, NCLB set higher expectations for Ameri-




65 See Elizabeth H. DeBray-Pelot, School Choice and Educational Privatization Initia-
tives in the 106th and 107th Congresses: An Analysis of Policy Formation and Political Ideolo-
gies, 109 TCHRS. C. REC. 927, 935 tbl.1 (2007) (indicating the initial position of
President Bush and the final compromise in Congress).  For an insider’s view of the
legislative strategy adopted by the Bush White House, see generally EUGENE W.
HICKOK, SCHOOLHOUSE OF CARDS (2010).
66 MCGUINN, supra note 48, at 180 tbl.9.2. R
67 Id. at 178.
68 Erik W. Robelen, An ESEA Primer, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 9, 2002, at 28.
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implementing these goals across a complex intergovernmental net-
work of federal and state agencies proved to be another matter.69
While educators continue to debate the merits of standardized
tests and the effect they can have on actual performance, the NCLB
requirement that test results be disaggregated by sub-groups of stu-
dents forced the country to face up to the great disparities in achieve-
ment that would continue to be found on the basis of race and
income.  Civil rights organizations and liberal education advocates
appreciated this requirement as a way to ensure better results for poor
and minority children and supported it throughout the legislative pro-
cess.70  Although allowing the states to set their own standards was an
important concession that satisfied reluctant lawmakers wanting to
protect local education prerogatives, the policy also compromised
expectations that NCLB would raise the proficiency bar for all stu-
dents across the nation.  States set widely different bars for profi-
ciency.  A study completed by the American Institutes for Research
using international benchmarks found that the actual proficiency
between students in the most and least rigorous states could be as
much as four grade levels.71
Many local policy makers set passing criteria at a low level so that
students would appear to be performing better than they actually
were.  An analysis conducted by the U.S. Department of Education
comparing state passing rates with passing rates on the highly
regarded NAEP tests from 2005 showed that there were not only wide
variations among the states for what a student needed to know to get a
“proficient” score, but also that rating criteria on the state tests were
lower than those on the national NAEP test.72
There were also serious problems with measuring annual yearly
progress (AYP) as a way to determine which students, schools, dis-
tricts, and states were meeting federal expectations.  Researchers ques-
69 For an excellent overview of the implementation issues regarding NCLB, see
generally DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY (2009)
(questioning the institutional capacity of state and local agencies to deliver services
effectively); PAUL MANNA, COLLISION COURSE (2011).
70 Jesse Hessler Rhodes, Progressive Policy Making in a Conservative Age? Civil Rights
and the Politics of Federal Education Standards, Testing, and Accountability, 9 PERSP. ON
POL. 519, 519–20, 530–31 (2011) (describing the role of these groups in the federal
legislative process).
71 GARY W. PHILLIPS, AM. INST. RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKING (2011).
72 See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., MAPPING STATE PROFICIENCY STANDARDS ONTO
NAEP SCALES 9 (2007); see also Paul E. Peterson & Carlos Xabel Lastra-Anadon, State
Standards Rise in Reading, Fall in Math, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2010, at 12, 15 (finding differ-
ent proficiency standards in reading and math among the states and generally lower
standards in the states when compared to the NAEP).
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tioned the validity of how test scores were applied to reach such
decisions.73  Even with such loose criteria in place, in the 2008–2009
school year, eighteen percent of all schools in the country were desig-
nated as being “in need of improvement.”74  In cases where it was
determined that corrective action was needed, students either were
not given or did not take advantage of opportunities to which they
were entitled.  Participation in the choice option rarely exceeded two
percent of the eligible students; participation in supplementary ser-
vice options rarely exceeded twenty-five percent.75
There is much speculation regarding the possible causes of such
low participation in these optional programs, ranging from allegations
of administrative incompetence at the local level to suspicion that dis-
trict and school officials undermined programs that would divert
resources from regular public schools.  The school choice question,
however, highlights a basic flaw in policy design.  The fact of the mat-
ter is that districts with a large number of failing students do not have
many desirable schools from which to choose.76  Thus, the transfer
option was essentially an empty promise to those students who might
have most benefitted from it.  By eliminating the private choice
option that President Bush wanted to include in the law, Congres-
sional Democrats rendered the policy useless.  Bush finally was able to
get Congress to approve a voucher plan for the District of Columbia
in 2003,77 after local Democratic leaders pleaded before Congress that
poor children needed opportunities beyond the floundering public
schools found in Washington, but that would only relieve the problem
in one city.78
Since it was not part of the Bush administration’s policy priorities,
the Department of Education did little to enforce the teacher quality
provisions of the law.  As late as 2007, not one state had met the highly
73 See, e.g., Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, Volatility in School Test Scores:
Implications for Test-Based Accountability Systems, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUCATION
POLICY 235, 235 (Diane Ravitch ed., 2002) (detailing sampling issues that complicate
the reporting of test score trends).
74 EPE RESEARCH CTR., SCHOOLS—ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS AND IMPROVEMENT
STATUS UNDER NCLB (2008).
75 PAUL MANNA, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, FEDERAL AID TO ELEMENTARY AND SECON-
DARY EDUCATION 11 (2008).
76 See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
77 District of Columbia School Choice Incentive Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-199,
118 Stat. 126 (2004).
78 See Anthony A. Williams et al., Washington’s Children Deserve More Choices, WASH.
POST, Sep. 3, 2003, at A17.  The bill was also strongly supported by Democratic Sena-
tor Diane Feinstein of California. See Dianne Feinstein, Let D.C. Try Vouchers, WASH.
POST, July 22, 2003, at A17. 
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qualified teacher deadline set for the 2005–2006 school year, and Sec-
retary of Education Margaret Spellings issued assurances that states
would not be penalized with a loss of federal funding for the infrac-
tions.79  That fall, twenty-two percent of the states and six percent of
the school districts indicated in a national survey that they were
unlikely to ever meet the requirements.80
NCLB officially expired in 2007.81  As the Bush administration
was entering its last year with low approval ratings, there was not much
interest in Congress to take up revision and deal with criticisms that
had surfaced.  Democrats and Republicans agreed that the assignment
could be taken up by the new president, whoever it might be.82  By the
time Barack Obama moved into the White House, NCLB seemed to
have had the opposite effect that its architects intended when they
wrote the law.  Expectations about the future of American education
were lowered.  The national goal of having every child reach profi-
ciency in basic skills by 2014 appeared to be out of reach.83  The talk
of waivers was in the air, and local politicians were telling their repre-
sentatives in Washington to be more realistic about what school dis-
tricts could deliver.
III. THE OBAMA AGENDA
Three years into its tenure, the Obama administration was still
unable to get Congress to reenact or revise NCLB.  However, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) that was passed in
early 2009 to stimulate the national economy in the midst of a serious
recession contained more federal funding for education than had
ever been made available by Congress.84  As a result, Secretary of Edu-
cation Arne Duncan was granted more discretion to shape policy for
elementary and secondary schools than any federal official in history,
79 See MANNA, supra note 69, at 58. R
80 See id. at 101.
81 Making Your Voices Heard: What Does NCLB Reauthorization Mean?, PUB. EDUC.
NETWORK, http://www.publiceducation.org/nclb_main/Reauth_What_It_Means.asp
(last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
82 See Regina Bankole & Rob Williams, Reauthorization of the No Child Left Behind
Act: Political Forces and Perspectives, 1 J. CROSS-DISCIPLINARY PERSP. EDUCATION 7, 11
(2008).
83 See CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, STATE TEST SCORE TRENDS THROUGH 2008–09, PART 4,
at 2–3 (2011) (examining test scores in 19 states for which reading and math scores
were available between 2002 and 2011 and finding that while Title 1 students have
made gains in achievement since 2002, and often improved more than non-Title 1
students, the former still remain well behind the latter).
84 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115.
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and he used it rather pointedly.  ARRA included the following
allocations:
• $5 billion for early education, including Head Start, Early Head
Start, child care and children with special needs;
• $77 billion for reforms to enhance elementary and secondary
education, including $48.6 billion to bolster state education
budgets that were destabilized by the financial crisis;
• $5 billion for competitive funds to generate innovation and
reform that would close the achievement gap.85
Since the initial $5 billion chunk of funding was used to maintain
federal commitments in preschool and special education programs,
and the bulk of the next $77 billion was used to plug holes in state
budgets and save jobs for teachers and other personnel, it was the
latter $5 billion that the Secretary used to shape new policy.86  The
latter included a $650 million Investing in Innovation Fund (i3)
designed to stimulate innovative proposals from school districts, indi-
vidual schools, and nonprofit organizations promising to improve
teacher effectiveness, low performing schools, standards and assess-
ments, or data systems.87  “Scale-up” grants for up to $50 million
would be awarded for proposals that provided strong evidence for suc-
cess.  Two tiers of smaller grants (up to $30 million and up to $5 mil-
lion) under “i3” would permit applicants to present plans backed by
more modest evidence.88  The “America COMPETES” Act dedicated
$46 million over three years to improve education in science, technol-
ogy, engineering, and math.89  An additional $143 million was made
available to support teacher residency and apprenticeship programs
under the Teacher Quality Partnership.90
85 Education, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://whitehouse.gov/issues/education (last
visited Feb. 23, 2012). See also Farhana Hossain et al., The Stimulus Package: Education
and Job Training, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Dec. 23, 2011), http://projects.nytimes.
com/44th_president/stimulus/education-and-job-training (detailing appropriations
relating to education in the stimulus bill). 
86 SARA MEAD ET AL., BELLWEATHER EDUC. PARTNERS, CONFLICTING MISSIONS AND
UNCLEAR RESULTS 9 (2009) (finding that although some ARRA funding was used to
advance ongoing reforms, most of it was applied to compensate for funding cuts
being made at the state and local levels).
87 See Michele McNeil, Coveted ‘i3’ Cash Prompts Application Gold Rush, EDUC.
WEEK, July 14, 2010, at 1, 28.
88 Id. at 28.
89 COMPETES is an acronym for Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Pro-
mote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science. See Erik Robelen, Obama
Signs Leaner Version of America COMPETES Act, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 12, 2011.
90 Stephen Sawchuk, Teacher Residencies Make Strides, Encounter Obstacles, EDUC.
WEEK, Jan. 13, 2011.
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By far, the most significant and central feature of the education
agenda put forward by the Obama Administration was Race to the
Top (RTT).  The program dedicated $4.35 billion for a competitive
grant program that would be allocated only to states that met specific
criteria established by the Department of Education to demonstrate
that state decision makers would follow the direction set by Secretary
Duncan.  Announcing the program on July 24, 2009, President
Obama declared:
This is one of the largest investments in education reform in Ameri-
can history.  And rather than divvying it up and handing it out, we
are letting states and school districts compete for it.  That’s how we
can incentivize excellence and spur reform and launch a race to the
top in America’s public schools.91
In discussing the criteria set by the administration in reviewing
state proposals, the President further explained:
This competition will not be based on politics or ideology or the
preferences of a particular interest group.  Instead, it will be based
on a simple principle—whether a state is ready to do what works.
We will use the best evidence available to determine whether a state
can meet a few key benchmarks for reform—and states that out-
perform the rest will be rewarded with a grant.  Not every state will
win and not every school district will be happy with the results.92
The draft criteria that the Secretary of Education set for evaluat-
ing state plans revolved around four broad policy objectives: adopting
internationally benchmarked standards; improving the recruitment,
retention, and compensation of teachers and school administrators;
improving data collection; and implementing strategies to turnaround
failing schools.93  Any state with a law that disallowed the use of stu-
dent achievement data for evaluating teachers or principals—which at
the time included New York and California, among others—was auto-
matically barred from competition.94  Among the strategies outlined
for upgrading teachers and principals was merit pay.95  Among the
turnaround strategies identified was an increased supply of high qual-
91 Remarks By the President on Education, July 24, 2009, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-Department-
of-Education (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
92 Id.
93 See Michele McNeil, Rich Prize, Restrictive Guidelines, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 12, 2009,
at 1 (citing a document from the Department of Education).
94 Id.
95 Id.
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ity charter schools.96  States also lost points if they had laws that
imposed a cap on the number of charter schools.97
Forty states and the District of Columbia submitted applications
for RTT funding.98  To the disappointment of many governors, the
Department of Education made awards to only two states (Delaware
and Tennessee) in March of 2010, but also announced sixteen final-
ists whose plans remained under consideration.99  In August, nine
states and the District of Columbia were granted awards.100  When
issuing the news, Secretary Duncan was keen to point out that during
the course of the competition thirty-five states and the District of
Columbia “have adopted rigorous common, college- and career-ready
standards in reading and math, and thirty-four states have changed
laws and policies to improve education,” suggesting that the new law
already had a discernible effect.101  In May 2011 the Secretary
announced that a smaller fund of money would be divided among
nine states that had narrowly missed being selected.102
While RTT could fairly be described as an aggressive attempt by
the federal government to drive education policy, the Obama admin-
istration made a serious effort to coordinate it with significant activi-
ties that were simultaneously occurring in the states.  In order to
address the wide variations in standards existing among the states, in
2009 the National Governors Association and the Council of Chief
State School Officers convened experts in English and math from
around the country to establish benchmarks for what students should
96 Id.
97 Id. The rating criteria were slightly changed in November, 2009. See Sam Dil-
lon, After Criticism, the Administration is Praised for Final Rules on Education Grants, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A20.  See appendix for scored criteria set by the Department
of Education to review applications.
98 Id. at A3.
99 See Sam Dillon, In School Aid Race, Many States Are Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2010, at A1.
100 The states were Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, and Rhode Island.  Arne Duncan, Nine States and the District of




102 In the original competition grants ranged from $75 million for the smallest
winners, such as Hawaii and Rhode Island, to $700 million for the largest, such as
Florida and New York.  A total of $200 million was divided among nine runner-ups.
Michele McNeil, New Race to Top Money Eyed Warily by Some, EDUC. WEEK, June 8, 2011,
at 18.
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be learning from grade to grade. 103  One year later, the two organiza-
tions disseminated a set of common core standards that states could
adopt on a voluntary basis.104  In order to propel the process, the
Obama administration indicated that states agreeing to adopt the
English and math benchmarks would be given points in the grant
competition for RTT funding.105  Within two months from when the
standards were disseminated, thirty-nine states announced their plans
for adoption as the August 2, 2010 deadline for the first round of
competition approached.106
Under RTT, the Department of Education also made money
available for consortia of states and private parties to work together to
develop grade-by-grade assessments that were coordinated with the
curriculum standards.107  This initiative was designed to address a
major flaw in testing policy that had become evident as a result of
NCLB.  In order for a test to have validity, it should be aligned with a
particular curriculum so that there is a symmetry between what stu-
dents are taught and what they are tested on.  Many, if not most, states
had put the testing cart before the teaching horse, administering stan-
dardized exams before having adopted a core curriculum.  The new
policy would hopefully not only allow testing to correspond to teach-
ing, it would also raise the standards for both using international
benchmarks.108
On September 2, 2010 Secretary Duncan announced that two
groups had won grants for developing common assessments.  The
Partnership for Assessment and Readiness for College and Careers
(PARC), with a membership of twenty-six states, received a $170 mil-
lion award; the Smarter Balance Assessment Consortium, with a thirty-
one–state membership, received $160 million.109  Twelve states were
members of both groups.  In all, forty-four states and the District of
Columbia were members of either or both.110  The groups are
expected to develop their plans by the 2014–2015 school year.  In
103 See Tamar Lewin, States Embrace Core Standards for the Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2010, at A1, A3.
104 Id. at A3.
105 Id. at A1.
106 See Catherine Gewertz, States Adopt Standards at Fast Clip, EDUC. WEEK, July 14,
2010, at 1, 18; Lewin, supra note 103, at A1. R
107 See Catherine Gewertz, Common-Assessment Consortia Add Resources to Plans,
EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 23, 2011, at 8.
108 See id.
109 See Sam Dillon, U.S. Asks Educators to Reinvent Student Tests, and How They Are
Given, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 3, 2010, at A11.
110 Id.
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announcing the awards, Secretary Duncan called the new develop-
ment “an absolute game-changer in public education.”  He continued:
An assessment system and curriculum can only be as good as the
academic standards to which the assessments and curriculum are
pegged.  We want teachers to teach to standards— if the standards
are rigorous, globally competitive, and consistent across states.
Unfortunately, in the last decade, numerous states dummied down
their academic standards and assessments.  In effect, they lied to
parents and students.  They told students they were proficient and
on track to college success, when they were not even close.111
The collaboration between the federal and state governments
that resulted from the RTT initiative was not just significant from a
policy perspective; it also marked a milestone in the evolution of fed-
eralism as it pertained to education.  What we have here is the federal
government using its power and resources to move the country toward
national standards designed collectively by the states, rather than forc-
ing states to follow federal standards coming from Washington.
IV. ASSESSING RTT
A fair reading suggests that there was much in RTT that was
designed to address factors that were found to be problematic with
ESEA and had been specifically problematic with regard its latest itera-
tion, NCLB.  Despite grumblings at the local level about the excessive
emphasis placed on testing, a national consensus had emerged that
valid tests were needed to gauge progress, that higher standards were
needed to move the county forward, that assessments had to be
aligned with a core curriculum, and most important of all, that the
states would play a leadership role to advance reform.  RTT’s focus on
quality teaching also highlighted an essential ingredient of the reform
agenda that had been a low priority during the Bush administration.
And the demand to turn around failing schools brought federal edu-
cation policy back to the egalitarian roots President Lyndon Johnson
had planted with the original passage of ESEA in 1965; for, after all,
academic failure was most persistent in poor communities and those
communities had a disproportionate number of African-American
and Latino children.
111 Beyond the Bubble Tests: The Next Generation of Assessments—Secretary Arne Duncan’s
Remarks to State Leaders at Achieve’s American Diploma Project Leadership Team Meeting,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/beyond-
bubble - tests - next - generation - assessments - secretary - arne - duncans - remarks - state - l
(emphasis added).
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There is, however, a fundamental flaw in the competitive strategy
behind RTT that seems to have reversed the logic of a compensatory
education policy.  The competitive allocation of resources could bene-
fit those states and districts with the greatest capacity, rather than
those jurisdictions that needed the most assistance and served the
most challenged students.  There can be honest disagreement about
this approach.  One of the constant criticisms of ESEA over the years
is that it had thrown good money after bad, investing in programs and
delivery systems that were chronically failing.112  Federal decision mak-
ers had been urged to support success rather than failure; to reward
those schools, administrators and teachers that were doing a good job.
Nonetheless, the competitive approach has its drawbacks.  Constituent
groups that could usually be counted within the camp of the Demo-
cratic Party, especially with the nation’s first African-American presi-
dent in the White House, challenged the direction the administration
was taking.
In July 2010, a group of civil rights organizations, led by the
NAACP and the National Urban League, issued its own education pol-
icy framework on the eve of the latter’s annual conference calling for
changes in ESEA and demanding that Secretary Duncan dismantle
key aspects of his core agenda as outlined in RTT.113  They argued
that relying on competitive funding means that the majority of low
income and minority children who live in the states that lose it will not
benefit from the new funds.  They also criticized the administration’s
“extensive reliance” on charter schools as a solution for turning
around failing schools in urban areas.114
Although both the President and Secretary Duncan acknowl-
edged the criticism by these organizations when they spoke at the con-
ference of the National Urban League, the administration did not
make any significant policy changes to accommodate the criticism.115
112 See COHEN & MOFFITT, supra note 69, at 17–44 (arguing that most states lacked R
the institutional capacity and resources to implement NCLB effectively).
113 The groups also included the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, The
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, National Council on Educating Black
Children, Rainbow PUSH Coalition, and the Schott Foundation for Public Education.
See Michele McNeil, Civil Rights Groups Call for New Federal Education Agenda,” EDUC.
WEEK (July 26, 2010, 10:00 a.m.), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/
2010/7/civil-rights-groups-call-for-n.html.
114 Id.
115 See Remarks by the President on Education Reform at the National Urban League
Centennial Conference, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 24, 2010, 10:09 a.m.), http://www.white
house . gov / the - press - office/remarks - president - education - reform - national - urban -
league-centennial-conference; Secretary Arne Duncan’s Remarks at the National Urban
League Centennial Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 27, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/
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Some civil rights groups have also contended, without much satisfac-
tion, that the Department of Education failed to give adequate atten-
tion to English language learners when appropriating money for
RTT.116
The proposition of using standardized tests to evaluate, compen-
sate and tenure teachers also drew strong criticism from the teacher’s
unions.  Nor, it should be added, were either of the two national orga-
nizations that represent teachers pleased with the emphasis on charter
schools.117  Delegates of the larger National Education Association
(NEA), with 3.2 million members, actually passed a vote of “no confi-
dence” with regard RTT.118  The smaller American Federation of
Teachers (AFT), with 1.5 million members, took a more moderate
tone.  Following the lead of its more conciliatory president Randi
Weingarten, the AFT indicated that under certain conditions, the
union could consider using student test scores for evaluating teachers
if the approach used included due process protections.119  Of course
the conditions needed to satisfy the AFT president and her members
were a tall order and went to the heart of the problem many believed
inherent in the administration’s approach to reform.
Despite assurances by President Obama that grants for RTT
would be made without regard to politics or ideology, there were
strong concerns that some of the key priorities behind RTT were not
research based.  The administration seemed to be moving ahead with
more certainty than was warranted.  This does not necessarily mean
that the priorities set were entirely motivated by politics, especially
since the White House was willing to take actions that contradicted
the preferences of key political allies.  Nevertheless, given the signifi-
cance of the actions taken under the RTT banner, these concerns are
worthy of attention.
In May 2011, the National Academy of Sciences released the
results of a nine-year study performed at the behest of the National
Research Council that raised serious doubts about the efficacy of test-
news/speeches/secretary-arne-duncans-remarks-national-urban-league-centennial-
conference.
116 These groups included National Council of La Raza and the National Associa-
tion of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials. See Mary Ann Zehr, Groups Say Race to
Top Overlooked ELL Pupils, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 6, 2010, at 18.
117 Stephen Sawchuk, NEA, AFT Choose Divergent Paths on Obama Goals, EDUC.
WEEK, Aug. 25, 2010, at 1.
118 Id.
119 See id.
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based incentives to improve educational performance.120  Overseen by
a distinguished group of researchers, the study looked at test-based
incentive systems, high school exit exams, experiments in teacher
merit pay, and other testing and accountability systems throughout
the country.121  The group reached two major conclusions:
—Test-based incentive programs, as designed and implemented in
programs that have been carefully studied, have not increased stu-
dent achievement enough to bring the United States close to the
levels of the highest achieving countries.
—The evidence we have reviewed suggests that high school exit
exam programs, as currently implemented in the United States,
decrease the rate of high school graduation without increasing
achievement.122
Other research focused on key aspects of the RTT agenda ques-
tioned whether there is sufficient evidence available for them to merit
such priority status at a time when resources are in short supply.  Let
us take each in turn.
A. Testing and Standards
There is no doubt that following on the heels of NCLB and initia-
tives propelled by the states, RTT has provided a stimulus for more
change; however, at times its targets have been too ambitious or down-
right unrealistic.  In order for change to have significant effects, an
extraordinary amount of coordination must take place at the state
level.  Not only must assessments be aligned with core curriculum
standards, these standards must be translated into actual curriculum
materials that can be used in the classrooms, teachers must be trained
to use them, and teacher evaluation systems must reflect all of the
above.123  A study released by the Center for Education Policy at the
120 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INCENTIVES AND TEST-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDU-
CATION (Michael Hout & Stuart W. Elliot, eds., 2011) .
121 See id. at 1–6.
122 Id. at 84–85. But see Thomas S. Dee & Brian A. Jacob, The Impact of No Child
Left Behind on Students, Teachers, and Schools, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIV-
ITY: FALL 2010, at 149, 150 (David H. Romer & Justin Wolfers eds., 2010) (finding that
NCLB generally helped the performance of elementary school students in mathemat-
ics, but not in reading); Helen F. Ladd & Douglas L. Lauen, Status Versus Growth: The
Distributional Effects of School Accountability Policies, 29 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 426,
428 (2010) (“Emerging from research of this type is that the introduction of a school-
based accountability program generally raises achievement when achievement is mea-
sured by the high-stakes test used in the accountability system.”).
123 NANCY KORBER & DIANE STARK RENTNER, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, STATES’ PRO-
GRESS AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS 6 (2011).
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end of 2010 indicated that this is a long, tedious process with quite a
bit of room for error and delay.124
The national survey received responses from forty-two states and
the District of Columbia.  Of these, thirty-six states indicated that they
had provisionally adopted the common standards in mathematics and
English put forward by the National Governors Association in cooper-
ation with the Council of State Schools Officers.  (By now forty-four
actually have).125  Thirty-three states indicated that they would alter
their professional development to align with the standards and that
they expected the changes to be implemented by 2012.126  An equal
number said that they were planning changes in curriculum guides
and materials, but only fourteen expected the changes to be complete
by 2012.  While thirty-six states indicated that they were planning
changes in testing, twenty-seven did not expect to have the changes
made before 2014 or later.127  This lag in the test development stands
to reason since the two groups working to design common assess-
ments under RTT are not expected to be done until 2014.  In the
meantime, states will lumber along with curricula, tests, and training
materials that officials at the federal and state levels agree are inade-
quate.  This puts the remainder of the reform agenda in a more realis-
tic and sobering context.
B. Evaluating Teachers
Beyond aligning curriculum, testing, and teacher development in
a timely fashion, the kind of teacher evaluation system that the
Obama administration seeks to establish requires the development of
valid and reliable instruments for isolating the contribution that indi-
vidual teachers make to what individual students learn.  This is indeed
a complex endeavor.  As John Ewing, president of Math for America, an
organization dedicated to improving math education, explains, there
are many variables that determine student achievement, and using
test scores to gauge the contribution of a particular teacher is ridden
with methodological traps. 128  Test scores are influenced by a number
124 See Catherine Gewertz, Full Standards-Based System Several Years Off, EDUC. WEEK,
Jan. 12, 2011, at 9.
125 KORBER & RENTNER, supra note 123, at 6. R
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 John Ewing, Mathematical Intimidation: Driven by the Data, 58 NOTICES AM. MATH-
EMATICAL SOC’Y, 667, 670 (2011).  For a more easy-to-read summary, see Valerie
Strauss, Leading Mathematician Debunks ‘Value Added’, WASH. POST (May 9, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/leading-mathematician-
debunks - value -added/2011/05/08/AFb999UG_blog .html. See generally DANIEL
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of factors, including a student’s incoming level of achievement, the
contribution of other teachers, peer groups, and parental involve-
ment.  Tests, after all, are only samples that cover a limited selection
of material.  With coaching and drilling, test scores can be raised with-
out improving learning.
William Sanders, who pioneered the “value-added modeling”
(VAM) approach in Tennessee in the mid-1990’s and replicated it in
North Carolina and other states, contends, however, that if evalua-
tions apply robust methods and safeguards, it is possible to distinguish
effective teachers from ineffective teachers.129  Sanders has disciples
and supporters who have brought their own data to the discussion to
show that the VAM approach can work when it is designed and imple-
mented correctly.130  In one particular study in Tennessee, Sanders
and Ballou found that controlling for student characteristics had a
negligible impact on estimated teacher effects.131  Other researchers
have found evidence that student test scores are higher in schools that
offer merit pay for teachers.132  Additionally, a broader debate is
shaped by the fact that without attempting to build evaluation systems
on hard data, most teacher evaluation systems do not distinguish
between successful and unsuccessful teachers and end up rating
ninety-eight percent of all teachers satisfactory.133
There is conflicting evidence on the prospect of developing an
airtight system that could be used to assess, promote, tenure, retain,
and compensate teachers.  One author who reviewed value-added
assessments that have been implemented in Houston and New York
City said that they “are at best a crude indicator of the contribution
KORETZ, MEASURING UP (2008) (providing a thorough analysis of shortcomings in
testing).
129 See William Sanders et al., The Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System: A Quanti-
tative Outcomes-Based Approach to Educational Assessment, in GRADING TEACHERS, GRADING
SCHOOLS (Jason Millman ed., 1997) (describing the original experiment).
130 See, e.g., HENRY I. BRAUN, EDUC. TESTING SERV., USING STUDENT PROGRESS TO
EVALUATE TEACHERS 15 (2005), available at http://www.isbe.state.il.us/peac/pdf/
primer.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2012); Jesse Rothstein, Teacher Quality in Educational
Production: Tracking, Decay, and Student Achievement, 125 Q.J. ECON. 175, 176 (2010).
131 See Dale Ballou et al., Controlling for Student Background in Value-Added Assessment
of Teachers, 29 J. EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 60 (2004).
132 See David N. Figlio & Lawrence W. Kenny, Individual Teacher Incentives and Stu-
dent Performance, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 901, 913 (2007).
133 DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, THE WIDGET EFFECT 12
(2009). See generally STEVEN GLAZERMAN ET AL., BROWN CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, EVALUAT-
ING TEACHERS (2010) (arguing for the implementation of a value-added approach to
teacher evaluations). 
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that teachers make to their students’ academic outcomes.”134  A three
year study of the Metropolitan Nashville School System in which mid-
dle school teachers participated voluntarily showed that students of
teachers eligible for bonuses did no better in the long term than those
of teachers in a control group that were not eligible for bonuses.135
An evaluation of the Teacher Advancement Program implemented in
Chicago, where Secretary of Education Arne Duncan was superinten-
dent, showed that after two years there was no evidence that the pro-
gram allowing teachers to be promoted and earn extra compensation
based on a combination of their value added to student achievement
and classroom observations raised student test scores.136  In all fair-
ness, it would have been unreasonable to expect such a program to
have a significant influence on student performance after only two
years.
Another more comprehensive review of existing research on
VAM’s prepared on behalf of the Economic Policy Institute found that
while standardized test scores are one measure that might be used to
make judgments about teacher effectiveness, they should be only part
of a more comprehensive evaluation.137  That, in fact, is what the
Obama Administration is demanding.
C. Turning Around Failing Schools
No reasonable person believes that children should be forced to
attend failing schools.  Yet the Obama demand to turn around failing
schools or close them down was met with some opposition.  There was
a certain logic to the plan.  About twelve percent of high schools
nationwide produce half the country’s dropouts.138  Secretary
Duncan, who made school turnarounds a centerpiece of his tenure as
superintendent of schools in Chicago, targeted 5000 of the lowest per-
134 SEAN P. CORCORAN, ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, CAN TEACHERS BE EVAL-
UATED BY THEIR STUDENTS’ TEST SCORES?  SHOULD THEY BE? 28 (2010).
135 MATTHEW SPRINGER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES, TEACHER
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 43–44 (2010).
136 STEVEN GLAZERMAN & ALLISON SEIFULLAH, MATHEMATICA POL’Y RESEARCH, INC.,
AN EVALUATION OF THE TEACHER ADVANCEMENT PROGRAM IN CHICAGO 31 (2010).
137 EVA L. BAKER ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 278, PROBLEMS
WITH THE USE OF STUDENT TEST SCORES TO EVALUATE TEACHERS 20 (2010).
138 See ROBERT BALFANZ, CTR. FOR SOCIAL ORG. OF SCH., LOCATING AND TRANSFORM-
ING THE LOW PERFORMING HIGH SCHOOLS WHICH PRODUCE THE NATION’S DROPOUTS
(2007); see also Editorial, Lessons for Failing Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at A18
(praising Duncan’s plan for helping strugglign schools). See generally ROBERT BALFANZ
& NETTIE LEGTERS, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON THE EDUC. OF STUDENTS PLACED AT RISK,
REPORT NO. 70, LOCATING THE DROPOUT CRISIS (2004) (detailing the types of high
schools that typically have high dropout rates).
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forming schools for transformation or closure as part of RTT.139  If
effective, the effort could have a real impact on the achievement gap
defined by race since a disproportionate number of students who
attend failing schools are poor and minority.  In actuality, however,
school turnarounds involved a softer alternative to the more aggres-
sive approach that initially had been envisioned.
When Duncan first proposed the plan, he endorsed a model for
addressing school failure that would have either replaced the princi-
pal and half the teachers in a school so designated, reopened the
school under a charter operator, or closed it down completely.140  The
revised guidelines issued in November 2009 placed more of an
emphasis on working with existing staff in a school through training,
coaching, and curriculum development before taking more drastic
measures.141  While the change was somewhat related to protests from
educators and teachers’ unions, it was also a response to on-the-
ground realities in the field.  As a survey by the New York Times later
found, there was not a sufficient number of professionals available to
fill principal vacancies.142  On average, forty-four percent of the
schools targeted for turnaround retained their original principals.
The percentage varied from sixty-eight percent in Michigan to twenty-
eight percent in New York.143
Although there is not an extensive body of research available to
document the ingredients of successful turnaround strategies, evalua-
tions of programs such as Success for All and Direct Instruction show
that they can result in significant levels of improvement over time. 144




142 See Sam Dillon, Replace the Principals?  Who Would Step In?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2011, at A15.
143 The other states that participated were California, Texas, Ohio, Missouri, Geor-
gia, and California, which included 317 of the 730 schools that the Department iden-
tified for school improvement. Id.
144 See Geoffrey D. Borman et al., Final Reading Outcomes of the National Randomized
Field Trial of Success for All, 44 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 701, 726–27 (2007); Elizabeth Coyne
Crowe et al., Examining the Core: Relations Among Reading Curricula, Poverty, and First
Through Third Grade Reading Achievement, 47 J. SCH. PSYCH. 187 (2009) (reporting on
Direct Instruction); Jean Stockard, Promoting Reading Achievement and Countering the
“Fourth Grade Slump”: The Impact of Direct Instruction on Reading Achievement in the Fifth
Grade, 15 J. EDUC. STUDENTS PLACED AT RISK 218 (2010). But see Debra Viadaro,
Research Doesn’t Offer Much Guidance on Turnarounds, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 12, 2009, at 10
(raising doubts about the overall practical utility of research on turnaround
strategies).
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The alternative of closing down failing schools does not offer
much hope on its own since districts with large numbers of failing
students tend to have a relatively small number of desirable schools to
offer as alternatives.  A study performed by the Consortium on Chi-
cago School Research at the University of Chicago in Secretary
Duncan’s former school district is informative on this issue.145
Between 2001 and 2009 the Chicago Public School District closed
forty-four schools because of low academic performance or underu-
tilization.146  Among other things, the study found that most students
who transferred out of closed schools wound up in schools that were
academically weak.147
The bottom line is that if failing schools are to be closed down,
parents and students need to be furnished with better educational
alternatives.  Thus one can understand the appeal of charter schools,
which do provide new and more education options, often in places
where they are needed the most.
D. Charters and Choice
Unfortunately, the Obama administration’s approach, particu-
larly its emphasis on charter schools, does not entirely comport with
the research evidence.  Most research on charter schools shows that,
on the whole, they do not perform any better than regular public
schools.148  One widely cited Stanford University study of 2403 charter
schools in fifteen states and the District of Columbia, or seventy per-
cent of the charter school population nationally, is a case in point.149
Comparing each charter school with a regular public school that was a
“virtual twin” in the demographic composition of its student body, the
Stanford study found that seventeen percent of the charters provided
a superior educational opportunity, forty-six percent showed results
that were indistinguishable, and thirty-seven percent had academic
results that were inferior to regular public schools.150  The results
varied by state, with charter schools in five states having higher learn-
145 MARISA DE LA TORRE & JULIA GWYNNE, CONSORTIUM ON CHICAGO SCH.
RESEARCH, WHEN SCHOOLS CLOSE (2009).
146 Id. at 1.
147 Id. at 2.
148 A recent meta-analysis of forty charter school studies found that while charter
schools outperform traditional schools in reading and math at the elementary school
level, there were no differences in performance  at the  high schools level. See JULIAN
R. BETTS & Y. EMILY TANG, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., THE EFFECT OF CHARTER
SCHOOLS ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 55 (2011).
149 CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE (2009).
150 Id. at 44.
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ing gains, in six states having lower gains, and in four having mixed
results.151  The study found that charter school performance in partic-
ular states was correlated with the contours of state policy.  Charter
schools in jurisdictions without caps on the number of charter
schools, which RTT selection criteria encouraged, tended to perform
better.  Charter schools in states that had multiple entities that could
authorize their establishment tended to do worse.152
There is evidence that charter schools are more racially isolated
than regular public schools.  One study of forty states and the District
of Columbia conducted by The Civil Rights Project at UCLA found
just that, noting that patterns varied by region and that since a dispro-
portionate number of charter schools are in urban areas, they tend to
attract a high percentage of black students.153  The report also noted
that segregation has been increasing at regular public schools.154  It is
also worth noting that students attend charter schools as a matter of
choice, whereas attendance at regular public schools is usually the
result of an assignment based on residence, which is often segregated.
Indeed, one of the more compelling arguments for school choice is
that it empowers poor and minority parents to select the school their
children attend.155  Having educational alternatives can be especially
beneficial in urban areas where poor and minority children are rou-
tinely assigned to failing public schools.  Study after study of school
choice programs consistently show that parents express higher satis-
faction with choice schools than traditional public schools, and one
reason they give is the opportunity to choose the school their child
attends.
Another more recent study performed in Massachusetts by a
group of economists from MIT showed that while charter schools in
that state did not generally boost student achievement, they were par-
ticularly effective in urban districts populated by low-income stu-
151 Jurisdictions where charter schools had higher gains included Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Illinois, Louisiana and Missouri; those with lower gains included Arizona, Flor-
ida, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio and Texas; those with mixed results included
California, District of Columbia, Georgia, and North Carolina. Id. at 42.
152 Id. (the charter school cap accounts for a difference of .03 standard
deviations).
153 ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY 80
(2010).
154 See id.
155 See JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY 114 (1999) (arguing that school
choice advances social justice).
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dents.156  Students in urban charter schools not only out-performed
their urban public school peers in reading and math, but also out-
performed their non-urban public school peers in math.157  Studies of
charter schools in Chicago and New York reported similar positive
effects when charter school students were compared with their public
school peers.158  These studies parallel research on Catholic schools,
which shows that these schools of choice were especially effective in
improving the high school graduation rates of low income students in
urban environments.159
While the Obama administration enthusiastically supports choice
in the form of charter schools, it tried to end a successful school
voucher program in the District of Columbia that provided scholar-
ships for 1900 low income students to attend private and parochial
schools.  The President argued that he “doesn’t believe that vouchers
are a long-term answer to our educational problems and the chal-
lenges that face our public school system.”160  The administration had
decided to end the five-year-old program in March 2009 by agreeing
to continue to fund students already in the program, but not allow any
others to apply.  The Secretary of Education also rescinded 216 schol-
arships that had already been awarded on the basis of a lottery.161
A Congressionally mandated evaluation of the program con-
ducted for the Department of Education compared academic per-
formance of students participating in the D.C. scholarship program
with a control group of students who had applied for the program but
were not selected by the lottery.162  It found that while there was no
156 Joshua D. Angrist et al., Explaining Charter School Effectiveness (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 17332, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w17332.
157 See id. at 10.
158 See, e.g., CAROLINE M. HOXBY ET AL., NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCHOOLS EVALUA-
TION PROJECT, HOW NEW YORK CITY’S CHARTER SCHOOLS AFFECT ACHIEVEMENT  (2009);
Caroline M. Hoxby & Jonah E. Rockoff, The Impact of Charter Schools on Student Achieve-
ment (Harvard Institute of Econ. Research Working Paper Series, 2004). These find-
ings of higher performance in urban charter schools are also corroborated in the
meta-analysis of Betts & Tang, supra note 139. R
159 See, e.g., William N. Evans & Robert M. Schwab, Finishing High School and Start-
ing College: Do Catholic Schools Make a Difference? 110 Q.J. ECON. 941, 943–44 (1995);
Derek Neal, The Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educational Achievement, 15 J.
LAB. ECON. 98, 100 (1997).
160 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 11, 2009,
2:17 p.m.), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/briefing-white-house-press-
secretary-robert-gibbs-31109.
161 See Editorial, School Vouchers, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2011, at A14.
162 PATRICK WOLF ET AL., INST. OF EDUC. SCI., EVALUATION OF THE D.C. OPPORTU-
NITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT (2010).
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conclusive evidence that the program improved academic outcomes
in reading and math, students who had used the scholarship program
to attend a private school had a high school graduation rate that was
twenty percent higher than those who had not participated in the pro-
gram.163  Parents also express higher levels of satisfaction than those
in the control group.164  In 2011, Congress restored funding for the
D.C. Scholarship Program as part of a budget compromise with the
Obama Administration and extended it for five years.165
V. REVISITING NCLB
In the fall of 2011, President Obama and Secretary of Education
Duncan announced the implementation of new guidelines that would
be used to grant waivers to states that were out of compliance with ten
central provisions of the NCLB law, including the requirement that all
students be proficient in reading and math by 2014.  Declaring the
ten-year-old law “broken” and noting that eighty percent of the
schools nationally would not reach the annual yearly progress (AYP)
expected of them, Secretary Duncan also outlined a set of conditions
that states would need to meet in order to qualify.166  The conditions
were very much aligned with the priorities set in the Race to the Top
initiative, towards which many states had already been moving.
Acknowledging that forty-four states and the District had already
agreed to adopt common standards and that forty-six states and the
District of Columbia are in the process of developing high quality
assessments, the administration added that beyond meeting these
requirements, states would need to focus on improving the lowest per-
forming five percent of their schools and create guidelines for teacher
evaluations tied in part to student performance.167  In addition to hav-
ing the 2014 proficiency deadline waived, states would be permitted to
reset the bar for acceptable growth and design their own accountabil-
ity systems.  States would also be relieved of having to provide after
school tutoring at failing schools or providing bus transportation to
better schools.168  While dropping the 2014 target of universal profi-
163 Id. at 3–4.
164 Id. at 1.
165 Michelle D. Anderson, Budget Compromise Puts Vouchers Back on Track for Students
in D.C., EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 27, 2011, at 25.
166 Michele McNeil & Alyson Klein, Obama Outlines NCLB Flexibility, EDUC. WEEK,
Sept. 28, 2011, at 1. See also Sam Dillon, Obama to Offer Waiver on Parts of Education
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2011, at A19 (describing the conditions and the plan’s
policy goals).
167 See McNeil & Klein, supra note 166. R
168 See Dillon, supra note 166. R
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ciency might be deemed “realistic,” it also amounts to a lowering of
expectations, the burden of which is bound to fall on the neediest
students.
Although the language of NCLB permits the Secretary of Educa-
tion to grant waivers, some have questioned whether his setting new
terms for such waivers was tantamount to using administrative discre-
tion to rewrite the law in violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine.  Republican Representative John Klein of Minnesota protested,
“In my judgment, he is exercising an authority and power he doesn’t
have.”169  Klein added, “We all know the law is broken and needs to be
changed.  But this is part and parcel with the whole picture with this
administration: they cannot get their agenda through Congress, so
they’re doing it with executive orders and rewriting rules.  This is
executive overreach.”170
In February 2012 the Secretary of Education granted waivers
from key provisions of NCLB to ten states, including the requirement
bringing all students to proficiency in reading and math by 2014.171
Shortly thereafter, twenty-six additional states and the District of
Columbia submitted applications for a second round of waivers to be
granted.172  In the meantime Congress and the President were still
unable to make substantial progress toward renewing the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act.
CONCLUSION
The Obama administration has moved the boundaries of federal-
ism significantly, enabling the federal government to have a marked
influence on elementary and secondary education nationally.  It has
done so in a way that advances the major objectives of No Child Left
Behind (NCLB), retaining a commitment to test-based information
that allows education officials to monitor the progress of states, school
districts, and distinct populations of students, even while offering
waivers to avoid some of the law’s requirements.  It has applied fund-
ing creatively to engage the states in a cooperative process that moves
the country closer to establishing standards that are consistent with
international benchmarks.  The continuing focus on assessment is
169 Sam Dillon, Obama Gives States Voice in No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2011, at A1, A13.
170 Id.
171 The states included Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, New Jersey, and Tennessee. See Winnie Hu, 10 States Are
Given Waivers From Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A13.
172 Michelle Mcneil, 26 States, D.C., Join Quest for NCLB Waivers, EDUC. WEEK,
March 7, 2012.
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important because it will be impossible to improve school perform-
ance generally or close the achievement gap for underperforming stu-
dents without clear information about where improvement is needed.
Although President Obama and Secretary Duncan have over-
stated the level of support that is found in professional research to
ground their priorities, with some exceptions, the policies themselves
are reasonable in light of problems that have become apparent with
the implementation of NCLB.  Education research is not a science; it
rarely provides undisputed evidence; and disagreement among
researchers can be used as a rationale for perpetuating a status quo
that does not serve students well.173  Some degree of experimentation
is appropriate in situations where it is widely apparent that existing
practices are inhibiting progress.  Conflicting evidence in research,
however, should not be used as an opportunity to act politically when
there is reason to believe that better alternatives exist.  On this score
the administration has a mixed record.
Given the tentative condition of state standards and assessments,
not to mention the overly optimistic timelines that the Obama admin-
istration has set for converting them into credible instruments for
teaching and evaluation, the current demand to hold teachers
accountable on the basis of student performance must proceed with
great caution.  What appears to be sound policy may unravel as school
officials at all levels attempt to put these requirements into practice.
So long as the development of sound assessments remains a work in
progress, the use of student tests to evaluate the performance of
teachers is fraught with problems.
The administration’s focus on failing schools and its determina-
tion to either reverse their course or close them down seems to be
very much in accord with the original goals of the Education and Sec-
ondary Education Act, which specifically was enacted to address the
educational needs of low income students.  Well-designed strategies to
turn such schools around should be an immediate priority for all edu-
cation administrators.  When such interventions do not succeed, par-
ents should be offered alternatives.  Because low-income districts have
relatively few effective schools, it is reasonable to expand the range of
options though the implementation of well-monitored choice
programs.
173 See generally Joseph P. Viteritti, Schoolyard Revolutions: How Research on Urban
School Reform Undermines Reform, 188 POL. SCI. Q. 233 (2003) (arguing that by putting
the burden of proof on reformers, the research community undermined the imple-
mentation of school choice experiments).
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Although charter schools have had a mixed record of perform-
ance, there is some evidence that they have been especially effective in
urban communities, where they are needed the most.  That being
said, the Obama administration’s attempt to close down a well-
received and moderately successful voucher program in the ailing Dis-
trict of Columbia school district, while it aggressively supports charter
schools, may be the most indefensible education decision it has made.
Finally, the Obama administration’s conversion of federal fund-
ing into a series of competitive grant programs carries enormous risks.
Its reasoning on this matter is understandable.  Over the years, the
federal government has garnered much deserved criticism for invest-
ing billions of dollars in programs that do not work.  Nevertheless,
there has also been consistent evidence over the years indicating that
federal ESEA dollars are not directed at the students who need them
the most.  A competitive strategy that rewards states and school dis-
tricts that demonstrate the most capacity may in fact ensure that fed-
eral dollars are awarded to those schools that need them the least.  A
recent report completed at Stanford University finds that the achieve-
ment gap between rich and poor students has grown significantly over
the past three decades, in fact exceeding the gap defined by race.174
This new evidence should serve as a cold reminder that President Lyn-
don Johnson’s determination to target school reform efforts at low-
income students was well-founded, and that we have a long way to go
before we can in good conscience redirect our focus.
174 Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between Rich and Poor:
New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY: RISING INEQUALITY,
SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN. 91 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard Murnane eds., , 2011).
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APPENDIX
Scored Criteria for “Race to the Top” Program175
State Success Criteria (125 points)
• Articulating State’s education reform agenda and LEA’s partici-
pation in it (65 points)
• Building strong state capacity to implement, scale up and sus-
tain proposed plans (30 points)
• Demonstrating significant progress in raising achievement and
closing gaps (30 points)
Standards and Assessments (70 points)
• Developing and adopting common standards (40 points)
• Developing and implementing common, high-quality assess-
ments (10 points)
• Supporting the transition to enhanced standards and high-
quality assessments (20 points)
Data Systems to Support Instruction (47 points)
• Fully implementing a statewide longitudinal data system (24
points)
• Accessing and using State’s data (5 points)
• Using data to improve instruction (18 points)
Great Teachers and Leaders (138 points)
• Providing high-quality pathways for aspiring teachers and prin-
cipals (21 points)
• Improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on per-
formance (58 points)
• Ensuring equitable distribution of effective teachers and princi-
pals (25 points)
• Improving the effectiveness of teacher and principal prepara-
tion programs (14 points)
• Providing effective support to teachers and principals (20
points)
Turning Around the Lowest Achieving Schools (50 points)
• Intervening in the lowest achieving schools and LEAs (10
points)
• Turning around the lowest achieving schools (40 points)
175 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009).
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General Selection Criteria (55 points)
• Making education funding a priority (10 points)
• Ensuring successful conditions for high-performing charters
and other innovative schools (40 points)
• Demonstrating other significant reform conditions (5 points)
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